Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were used to identify targets that were then engaged by separate platforms. The success of net-centric warfare in the Gulf War surprised even U.S. military planners. The US was able to find and severely degrade the Iraqi army from the air. Coalition ground forces were able to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with relative ease in a short 100 hour campaign. This was in sharp contrast to the 10,000+ casualties that U.S. military planners had expected in the war.
Net-centric warfare has become the standard way the U.S. military fights. In the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has deployed a wide range of ISR platforms all transmitting data back to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Using a range of digital command and control systems within the CAOC, aircraft are dynamically tasked to engage targets as they are located. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) on the ground are able to digitally pass coordinates to close air support aircraft.
This ability to dynamically identify, target and engage enemy targets is outlined in Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-60 "Targeting". 2 This document describes the six phases of dynamic targeting: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA). This processing is commonly referred to as the "kill chain". While in some cases this process may play out on a single platform, typically multiple platforms digitally connected share information in real-time and collaboratively work to execute the kill chain. The following example demonstrates this concept.
A JSTARS aircraft locates a vehicle convoy and then transmits the data to the Common Operating Picture (COP) in the CAOC. The CAOC tasks an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to gather more detailed info on the convoy. The sensor data from the UAV (which is being flown remotely), is transmitted back to the CAOC where intelligence analysts confirm the convoy as a hostile priority target. Using digital C2 systems in the CAOC, a B-1 is then digitally tasked to engage the convoy. Coordinates are then digitally passed from the JSTARS aircraft to the B-1, which engages the targets using precision guided munitions.
The above is an example of net-centric warfare which has greatly reduced the time it takes to execute the kill chain, and in many cases allows time sensitive targets to be engaged that would have been impossible in the past. By compressing the kill chain, it allows the U.S. military to operate within the decision cycle of the enemy and defeat them before they have the chance to react. While the individual platforms get a lot of attention, it is the data links which connect the platforms that enable this method in which we conduct war.
A2/AD Information Environment
While not perfect, these data links have more or less worked in the permissive environment in which we have fought during the last 10 years. However, as we look to the future, it is likely that potential adversaries will use anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies to deny the US military the ability to project its combat power. Military conflicts of the last 20 years have shown potential adversaries the folly in attacking the US force-on-force. Rather they seek asymmetric capabilities to attack our vulnerabilities. One of these vulnerabilities is the data links which enable the net centric way in which we fight.
In his article, "Delivering Air Sea Battle", Admiral Mark Fitzgerald postulates that "operating in a highly contested electromagnetic environment" will be one of three main challenges facing the military in the future. In order to disrupt US military capabilities, he sees the enemy of the future attacking our communication links. In order to operate in these environments in the future, he advocates the development of "self-forming network architectures, both line of sight and wide area networks using surrogate air-breathing satellites and point-to-point laser or radio frequency satellite communications." He declares that investments in military digital networks have lagged behind the development of next generation weapons systems. Admiral Fitzgerald recommends that the network architecture be developed and the acquisition process started immediately. 3 Lt Gen David Deptula also believes that the military's ability to command and control its forces is threatened. He believes that the enemy will threaten our communication links as well as our C2 facilities. In his recent article "A New Era for Command and Control of Aerospace
Operations", Gen Deptula advocates for a "Combat Cloud" which would rely on "informationage technologies to enable highly interconnected, distributed operations". This combat cloud would rely on "highly distributed, self-evolving, and self-compensating network of networks."
He envisions a future in which all platforms are able to seamlessly transfer data between each other using self-forming networks. 4 Both Gen Deptula and Admiral Fitzgerald recognize the important of "nontraditional"
ISR capabilities in the future A2/AD fight. Admiral Fitzgerald states that "every platform will be a sensor." 5 This sentiment is echoed by Gen Deptula when he notes that the F-22 and F-35 are not just fighters but flying sensors that are able to operate in a denied environment unlike many of the traditional ISR platforms. 6 They both see a future in which the contested environment makes traditional ISR much more difficult and the military will need to rely on fifth-generation platforms like the F-35 that are able to operate in the A2/AD environment as sensor platforms.
In order to make this possible, it will be important to outfit these platforms with the proper communication links that will be able to distribute the high bandwidth data gathered by these sensors.
Similarly, in the future A2/AD environment the collaboration between sensor and shooter will become increasingly important. Gen Deptula describes a scenario in which sensors aboard an F-35 are used to cue Aegis fleet missile defense batteries. 7 As part of the Systems of Systems Integration Technology and Experimentation program, DARPA proposes using swarms of small cheap UAVs to penetrate a non-permissive environment. The UAVs would be used to form a sensor net to locate components of a mobile integrated air defense system (IADS). The sensor data would be transmitted to a manned 5 th generation aircraft like the F-35 in which an operator onboard would use this data to select targets. The target data would then be linked to a "missile truck" similar to a C-17 operating outside of the treat radius of the IADS. The missile truck would then launch a salvo of standoff munitions against the enemy IADS. 8 Many of these types of scenarios have been proposed by military thinkers in response to the challenges of the A2/AD environment, but the glue that holds it all together is the communication links. To make this type of warfare possible, the platforms must be connected by robust, flexible links with enough bandwidth to share vast amounts of sensor data along with the ability to remotely control UAVs and net-enabled munitions.
To meet the challenges posed by highly contested environments in 2030, the U.S.
military needs to immediately invest in the capabilities that will enable digital communications between platforms in this difficult setting. In an effort to counter U.S. military capabilities, opposing forces will only become more dispersed, mobile, and difficult to locate. This will require the U.S. to maximize the number of sensors over target and quickly share this data with
shooters. This will only increase the U.S. reliance on data link technologies in future combat.
The challenges facing digital communications in the future must be analyzed, solutions identified, and technologies developed if the U.S. is to maintain its dominance on the battlefield. is a Subsurface PPLI, a J2.5 is a Land Point PPLI, and J2.6 is a Land Track PPLI. Each one of these messages will then be further broken down to the bit level. For example a J2.2 contains specific fields for things like location, amount of fuel onboard, types of armaments carried. Each of these fields are predefined in the standard and you can only share these types of data. If you wanted to share some sort of information not contained in these predetermined fields you are out of luck.
Even more limiting is the fact that that data you can put into one of these fields is limited
to set values. This is why in the opening example, a locomotive had to be used to identify a In addition to the severe limitations on the type of data that can be shared using current data links, they are constrained in the amount of bandwidth available due to outdated radio technology. For example, Link 16 uses a primitive Time Domain Multiple Access (TDMA)
protocol to share available bandwidth 14 . The TDMA protocol is designed to deconflict in time when different clients transmit so that transmissions from different clients do not conflict and jam each other.
Link 16 breaks up time into 12 second periods called frames 15 . A 12 second frame consists of 1,536 times slots. A J-Series message, which was described above, is sent during each of these time slots. For each client in the network, it is preassigned during which of these 1,536 time slots it will transmit. This assignment is contained in the network design load (NDL).
Since each of the 1,536 time slots has to be assigned to a participant in the NDL, they end up being very complicated documents. In addition, the NDL has to be individually loaded into each network participant after it is created.
For these reasons, it is not easy to change the NDL very often. For example, it is common for a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to update their NDL on around a yearly basis. Therefore, the NDL must include every platform that might possibly be in a GCC's area of operations over the next year. This results in the 1,536 time slots being broken up between hundreds of platforms, some of which may not even be currently in theater. At any one time, only a small fraction of these platforms may be flying, so the time slots for all of the other nonflying platforms go unused. Therefore, even if only two aircraft are currently a participant in a Link 16 network, rather than being able to use half the bandwidth, they are only able to use a small fraction of the bandwidth since it must be split between every platform that may be part of the network over the next year.
As you can imagine, modern communications systems would not be possible using this type of archaic process to share bandwidth. Could you imagine if the LTE cellular signal had to be split between every cell phone that might possibly be connected to a cell tower? In the United
States, the available bandwidth would have to be split 100 million ways making it impossible to do the things that have been made possible by the communications revolution like browsing the web, streaming video, etc. Thankfully, more modern protocols have been invented like Carrier
Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) that allows bandwidth to be efficiently shared by the current participants in a network 16 .
As more and more military platforms become networked and the information sharing requirements increase in the dynamic A2/AD environment of the future, it will be essential to adopt a communications architecture that makes efficient use of bandwidth and does not require network participants to be identified a year in advance. Dynamic networks with dynamic participants will be necessary for the agile sharing of information. It will be important to share bandwidth efficiently in order to transmit what data is required in the future to include high resolution video and imagery.
One of the main reasons for the difficulty in upgrading military data links to take advantage of technological advancement is their highly coupled nature. The radio hardware, the types of messages that can be sent, the underlining communications protocols, and the client applications are all tightly coupled into single systems that can't be broken up and upgraded and is made up of four parts: HTML, HTTP, a Web server, and a browser. 20 Throughout the 1990s, the internet grew exponentially from around 100,000 users to around 300 million people connected to the internet. 21 By the end of the 90s, the internet consisted of hundreds of different applications with the four main applications being: email, the Web, instant messaging, and peerto-peer file sharing. to transmit these messages. By relying on a modular design, each independent layer can be modified without affecting the other layers. The layered design provides the agility to constantly update portions of a large and complex system at a manageable level. The TCP/IP model is built on five layers: the application, transport, network, link, and physical layers. 24 The application layer consists of the network applications and the protocols that they use. 25 The The routers and switches that make up the internet could care less whether a Facebook update or a Netflix movie is being sent over them. This has allowed application developers to build whatever they can imagine without being limited by the underlining communications system. This is in great contrast to the data link systems currently being used to send messages to airborne platforms. As described earlier, these systems can generally only send one very specific type of message, i.e. J-series message in Link 16. This has greatly hindered the development of applications onboard military aircraft to one very specific application that utilizes that corresponding specific message.
The next layer is the transport layer. Two main protocols exist at this layer: TCP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). 26 TCP connects network applications together to create an endto-end connection between them. In addition, TCP takes the messages from the application layer and breaks long messages into manageable sizes. The application messages are stuffed or encapsulated into a TCP message called a segment. It also contains a flow control algorithm that controls the sending rate of messages so that the network does not become clogged. Finally, TCP ensures reliable delivery of the application messages and resends any that are lost while being sent on the network. TCP is used for any messages that you want to be reliably delivered.
UDP is a no-frills service which simply sends messages without the above services. It is used for real time applications like streaming video and voice in which it does not make sense to resend lost packs.
The network layer is the core of the TCP/IP stack. The network layer message is called a datagram which contains the TCP segment from the transport layer. 27 The IP exists in the to the local ground node, which will relay the message to the other ground node over JREAP-C.
That message will then be transmitted to the second aircraft by Link 16 to the second aircraft.
Security
One of the criticisms of embracing the TCP/IP model has been security. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore cyber security in detail. However, when compared to legacy data connected to both a satellite and ground stations. 35 The Navy is currently engaged in an effort to install MR-TCDL on the E-6B, which is an airborne command and control platform for nuclear forces. The effort is scheduled to be completed by FY17. Boeing 707, a surrogate CAOC and three mobile ground nodes. 38 While the maximum bandwidth is significantly less than CDL, it is omnidirectional which makes it more ideal for maneuverable aircraft like fighters. The omnidirectional nature also lets multiple participants easily join and participate in the network unlike point-to-point solutions with directional antennas which can only connect to one other node. In addition, the omnidirectional nature allows TTNT to link with multiple users on the ground and could be used in mission sets like digital close air support (CAS). TTNT could also be used to control multiple network enabled weapons. TTNT could also enable scenarios in which the weapon is controlled by a node other than the shooter. For example, a weapon could be dropped and control of the weapon could be handed off to a JTAC on the ground. In 2013, TTNT was demonstrated onboard the X-47B, the Navy's experimental Unmanned Combat Air System. 40 In August of 2014, the Navy awarded a contract to integrate TTNT into the Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radios System (MIDS JTRS)
terminal which is expected to be completed by August 2017. The MIDS JTRS terminal is the latest version of the MIDS Link 16 terminal. 41 If this effort is successful, then the MIDS JTRS terminal would be able to transmit both the Link 16 and TTNT waveforms. at a critical junction where decisions made today will have an enormous impact on the information sharing capabilities that will be available in the future A2/AD fight. It will be crucial for the DoD to embrace these types of TCP/IP enabled systems and develop a deliberate and comprehensive deployment plan. Senior leaders must resist the temptation to be complacent with the current systems and instead forge ahead with a modern information age communications paradigm. Failure to do so will lead to a military paralyzed by the fog a war in the A2/AD environment due to the inability to rapidly and reliably share information.
